Subtle Implicit Language Facts Emerge from the Functions of Constructions by Adele E. Goldberg
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 28 January 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.02019
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2019
Edited by:
N. J. Enfield,
University of Sydney, Australia
Reviewed by:
Jeffrey Lidz,
University of Maryland, USA
Elizabeth Closs Traugott,
Stanford University, USA
*Correspondence:
Adele E. Goldberg
adele@princeton.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Language Sciences,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 26 October 2015
Accepted: 17 December 2015
Published: 28 January 2016
Citation:
Goldberg AE (2016) Subtle Implicit
Language Facts Emerge from the
Functions of Constructions.
Front. Psychol. 6:2019.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.02019
Subtle Implicit Language Facts
Emerge from the Functions of
Constructions
Adele E. Goldberg*
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Much has been written about the unlikelihood of innate, syntax-specific, universal
knowledge of language (Universal Grammar) on the grounds that it is biologically
implausible, unresponsive to cross-linguistic facts, theoretically inelegant, and
implausible and unnecessary from the perspective of language acquisition. While
relevant, much of this discussion fails to address the sorts of facts that generative
linguists often take as evidence in favor of the Universal Grammar Hypothesis: subtle,
intricate, knowledge about language that speakers implicitly know without being taught.
This paper revisits a few often-cited such cases and argues that, although the facts
are sometimes even more complex and subtle than is generally appreciated, appeals
to Universal Grammar fail to explain the phenomena. Instead, such facts are strongly
motivated by the functions of the constructions involved. The following specific cases
are discussed: (a) the distribution and interpretation of anaphoric one, (b) constraints
on long-distance dependencies, (c) subject-auxiliary inversion, and (d) cross-linguistic
linking generalizations between semantics and syntax.
Keywords: anaphoric one, island constraints, subject-auxiliary inversion, universal grammar, grammatical
constructions
INTRODUCTION
We all recognize that humans have a different biological endowment than the prairie vole, the
panther, and the grizzly bear. We can also agree that only humans have human-like language.
Finally, we agree that adults have representations that are specific to language (for example, their
representations of constructions). The question that the present volume focuses on is whether we
need to appeal to representations concerning syntax that have not been learned in the usual way—
that is on the basis of external input and domain-general processes—in order to account for the
richness and complexity that is evident in all languages. The Universal Grammar Hypothesis is
essentially a claim that we do. It asserts that certain syntactic representations are “innate,”1 in the
sense of not being learned, and that these representations both facilitate language acquisition and
constrain the structure of all real and possible human languages2.
I take this Universal Grammar Hypothesis to be an important empirical claim, as it is often
taken for granted by linguists and it has captured the public imagination. In particular, linguists
1I put the term “innate” in quotes because the term lacks an appreciation of the typically complex interactions between genes
and the environment before and after birth (see Deák, 2000; Blumberg, 2006; Karmiloff-Smith, 2006 for relevant discussion).
2Universal Grammar seems to mean different things to different researchers. In order for it to be consistent with its
nomenclature and its history in the field, I take the Universal Grammar Hypothesis to claim that there exists some sort of
universal but unlearned (“innate”) knowledge of language that is specific to grammar.
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often assume that infants bring with them to the task of learning
language, knowledge of noun, verb, and adjective categories,
a restriction that all constituents must be binary branching, a
multitude of inaudible but meaningful “functional” categories
and placeholders, and constraints on possible word orders. This is
what Pearl and Sprouse seem to have inmind when they note that
positing Universal Grammar to account for our ability to learn
language is “theoretically unappealing” in that it requires learning
biases that “appear to be an order (or orders) of magnitude more
complex than learning biases in any other domain of cognition”
(Pearl and Sprouse, 2013, p. 24).
The present paper focuses on several phenomena that have
featured prominently in the mainstream generative grammar
literature, as each has been assumed to involve a purely
syntactic constraint with no corresponding functional basis.
When constraints are viewed as arbitrary in this way, they appear
to be mysterious and are often viewed as posing a learnability
challenge; in fact, each of the cases below has been used to argue
that an “innate” Universal Grammar is required to provide the
constraints to children a priori.
The discussion below aims to demystify the restrictions
that speakers implicitly obey, by providing explanations of
each constraint in terms of the functions of the constructions
involved. That is, constructions are used in certain constrained
ways and are combined with other constructions in constrained
ways, because of their semantic and/or discourse functions.
Since children must learn the functions of each construction
in order to use their language appropriately, the constraints
can then be understood as emerging as by-products of learning
those functions. In each case, a generalization based on the
communicative functions of the constructions is outlined and
argued to capture the relevant facts better than a rigid and
arbitrary syntactic stipulation (see also DuBois, 1987; Hopper,
1987; Michaelis and Lambrecht, 1996; Kirby, 2000; Givón, 2001;
Auer and Pfänder, 2011). Thus, recognizing the functional
underpinnings of grammatical phenomena allows us to account
for a wider, richer range of data, and allows for an explanation of
that data in a way that purely syntactic analyses do not.
In the following sections, functional underpinnings of
the distribution and interpretation of various constructions
are offered including anaphoric _one_, various long-distance
dependences, subject-auxiliary inversion, and cross-linguistic
linking generalizations.
ANAPHORIC ONE
Anaphoric One’s Interpretation3
There are many interesting facts of language; let’s consider
this one. The last word in the previous sentence refers to an
“interesting fact about language” in the first clause; it cannot
refer to an interesting fact that is about something other than
language. This type of observation has been taken to imply that
one anaphora demonstrates “innate” knowledge that full noun
3This section is based on Goldberg and Michaelis (2015), which contains a much
more complete discussion of anaphoric one and its relationship to numeral one
(and other numerals).
phrases (or “DP”s) contain a constituent that is larger than a noun
but smaller than a full noun phrase: an N/ (interesting fact of
language above), and, that one anaphora must refer to an N/, and
may never refer to a noun without its grammatical complement
(Baker, 1978; Hornstein and Lightfoot, 1981; Radford, 1988;
Lidz et al., 2003b). However, as many researchers have made
clear, anaphoric one actually can refer to a noun without
its complement as it does in the following attested examples
from the COCA corpus (Davies, 2008; for additional examples
and discussion see Lakoff, 1970; Jackendoff, 1977; Dale, 2003;
Culicover and Jackendoff, 2005; Payne et al., 2013; Goldberg and
Michaelis, 2015)4 .
1. “not only would the problem of alcoholism be addressed, but
also the related one of violence,” [smallest N/ = problem of
alcoholism; but one= “problem”]
2. “it was a war of choice in many ways, not one of necessity.”
[smallest N/ = war of choice; one= “war”]
3. “Turning a sense of ostracism into one of inclusion is a
difficult trick. [smallest N/ = sense of ostracism; one= “sense”]
4. “more a sign of desperation than one of strength” [smallest
N/ = sign of desperation; one = “sign”]
In each case, the “of phrase” (e.g., of alcoholism in 1) is a
complement according to standard assumptions and therefore
should be included in the smallest available N/ that the syntactic
proposal predicts one can refer to. Yet in each case, one actually
refers only to the previous noun (problem, war, sense, and sign,
respectively, in 1–4), and does not include the complement of the
noun.
In the following section, I outline an explanation of one’s
distribution and interpretation, which follows from its discourse
function. To do this, it is important to appreciate anaphoric one’s
close relationship to numeral one, as described below.
The Syntactic and Semantic Behavior of
One are Motivated by its Function
Leaving aside the wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic
entities that one can refer to for a moment, let us consider
the linguistic contexts in which one itself occurs. Goldberg
and Michaelis (2015) observe that anaphoric one has the same
grammatical distribution as numeral one (and other numerals),
when the latter are used without a head noun. The only formal
distinction between anaphoric one and the elliptical use of
numeral one is that numeral one receives a sentence accent, as
indicated by capital letters in Table 1, whereas anaphoric one
must be unstressed (Goldberg and Michaelis, 2015).
The difference in accent between cardinal and anaphoric one
reflects a key difference in their functions. Whereas cardinal
one is used to assert the quantity “1,” anaphoric one is used
when quality or existence—not quantity—is at issue. That is, if
asked about quantity as in (5), a felicitous response (5a) involves
cardinal one, which is necessarily accented (5a; cf. 5b). If the
4A version of the first sentence also allows one to refer to an interesting fact that is
not about language:
a. There are many interesting facts of language, but let’s consider this one about
music .
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type of entity is at issue as in (6), then anaphoric one, which is
necessarily unaccented, is used (6b; cf. 6a):
5. Q: How many dogs does she have?
a. She has (only) ONE. (cardinal ONE)
b. #She has a big one. (anaphoric one)
6. Q: What kind of dog does she have
a. #She has (only) ONE (cardinal ONE)
b. She has a BIG one. (anaphoric one).
It is this fact, that anaphoric one is used when quality and not
quantity is at issue, that explains why anaphoric one so readily
picks out an entity, recoverable in the discourse context, that
often corresponds to an N/: anaphoric one often refers to a noun
and its complement (or modifier) because the complement or
modifier supplies the quality. But the quality can be expressed
explicitly as it is in (6b; with big) or in (1–4) with the overt
complement phrases5. If existence (and not quality or quantity) is
at issue, anaphoric one can refer to a full noun phrase as in (7):
7. [Who wants a drink?] I’ll take one.
Thus, given the fact that anaphoric one exists in English,
its semantic relationship to cardinal numeral one predicts its
distribution and interpretation. Anaphoric one is used when the
quality or existence of an entity evoked in the discourse—not its
cardinality—is relevant.
The only additional fact that is required is a representation of
the plural form, ones, and both the form and the function of ones
is motivated because ones is a lexicalized extension of anaphoric
one (Goldberg and Michaelis, 2015). Ones differs from anaphoric
one only in being plural both formally and semantically; like
singular anaphoric one, plural ones evokes the quality or existence
and not the cardinality of a type of entity recoverable in context.
There are several lessons that can be drawn from this simple
case. First, if we are too quick to assume a purely syntactic
generalization without careful attention to attested data, it is
easy to be led astray. Moreover, it is important to recognize
relationships among constructions. In particular, anaphoric one
is systematically related to numeral one, and a comparison of
the functional properties of these closely related forms serves to
explain their distributional properties.
TABLE 1 | Distributional contexts for anaphoric one and the elliptical use
of cardinal one.
Anaphoric one Numeral one (1)
She asked for one. She asked for ONE
She got a blue one. She got a mere ONE.
She only wanted that one. She only wanted that ONE.
She was one of a group. She was ONE of a group.
The two differ only in that only numeral one receives a sentence accent and asserts the
quantity “1.”
5To fully investigate the range of data that have been proposed to date in the
literature, judgment data should be collected in which contexts are systematically
varied to emphasize definiteness, quality, existence and cardinality.
There remain interesting questions about how children learn
the function of anaphoric one. But once we acknowledge that
children do learn its function—and they must in order to use it
in appropriate discourse contexts—there is nothing mysterious
about its formal distribution.
CONSTRAINTS ON LONG DISTANCE
DEPENDENCIES
The Basic Facts
Most languages allow constituents to appear in positions other
than their most canonical ones, and sometimes the distance
between a constituents’ actual position and its canonical position
can be quite long. For example, when questioned, the phrase
which/that coffee in (8) is not where it would appear in a canonical
statement; instead, it is positioned at the front of the sentence,
and there is a gap (indicated by “____”) where it would normally
appear.
8. Which coffee did Pam say Sam likes ____better than tea?
(cf. Pam said Sam likes that coffee better than tea.)
This type of relationship is often discussed as if the constituent
“moved” or was “extracted” from its canonical position, although
no one has believed since Fodor et al. (1974) that themovement is
anything more than a metaphor. I use more neutral terminology
here and refer to the relation between the actual position and the
canonical position as a long-distance dependency (LDD).
There are several types of LDD constructions including wh-
questions, the topicalization construction, cleft constructions,
and relative clause constructions. These are exemplified in
Table 2.
Ross (1967) long ago observed that certain other types of
constructions resist containing the gap of a LDD. That is,
certain constructions are “islands” from which constituents
cannot escape. Combinations of an “island construction”
with a LDD construction result in ill-formedness (see
Table 3):
TABLE 2 | Examples of long distance dependency (LDD) constructions:
constructions in which a constituent appears in a fronted position instead
of where it would canonically appear.6
Wh-questions What did Pam say Sam likes ___better than tea?
Topicalization construction That coffee, Pam said Sam likes ___better than
tea.
It-cleft construction It was that coffee that Pam said Sam likes
___better than tea.
Relative Clause construction She tasted the coffee that Pat said Sam likes
__better than tea.
6Other LDD constructions include comparatives (Bresnan, 1972; Merchant, 2009)
and “tough” movement constructions (Postal and Ross, 1971) which should fall
under the present account as well; more study is needed to investigate these cases
systematically from the current perspective (see Hicks (2003); Sag (2010); for
discussion).
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TABLE 3 | Examples of island constructions: constructions that resist
containing the gap in a LDD (Ross, 1967).
??Who did [that she hit _] was horrible?
(cf. [That she hit him] was horrible.)
Subjects
??Who did she see [the boy who met __]?
(cf. She saw [the boy who met Sally]) (Most) complex noun
phrases
??What did she read [the letter that was about__]?
(cf. She read [the letter that was about mountains])
??Who did she mumble/deny [he liked__]?
(cf. She mumbled/denied [he liked Katherine]).
Clausal complements of
manner of speaking and
factive verbs
(Certain) adjuncts
??Who did she eat spaghetti [while talking to __on
the phone]?
(cf. She ate spaghetti [while talking to Jenny on the
phone]).
A Clash Between the Functions of LDD
Constructions and the Functions of Island
Constructions
Several researchers have observed that INFORMATION
STRUCTURE plays a key role in island constraints (Takami,
1989; Deane, 1991; Engdahl, 1997; Erteschik-Shir, 1998;
Polinsky, 1998; Van Valin, 1998; Goldberg, 2006, 2013; Ambridge
and Goldberg, 2008). Information structure refers to the way
that information is “packaged” for the listener: constituents are
topical in the discourse, part of the potential focus domain, or
are backgrounded or presupposed (Halliday, 1967; Lambrecht,
1994). Different constructions that convey “the same thing,”
typically exist in a given language in order to provide different
ways of packaging the information, and thus information
structure is perhaps the most important reason why languages
have alternative ways to say the “same” thing. As explained below,
the ill-formedness of island effects arises essentially from a clash
between the function of the LDD construction and the function
of the island construction. First, a few definitions are required.
The FOCUS DOMAIN is that part of a sentence that is asserted.
It is thus “one kind of emphasis, that whereby the speaker marks
out a part (which may be the whole) of a message block as
that which he wishes to be interpreted as informative” Halliday
(1967: 204). Similarly Lambrecht (1994: 218) defines the focus
relation as relating “the pragmatically non-recoverable to the
recoverable component of a proposition [thereby creating] a new
state of information in the mind of the addressee.” What parts
of a sentence fall within the focus domain can be determined
by a simple negation test: when the main verb is negated, only
those aspects of a sentence within the potential focus domain are
negated. Topics, presupposed constituents, constituents within
complex noun phrases, and parenthetical remarks are not part
of the focus domain, as they are not negated by sentential
negation:7
7Backgrounded constituents can be negated with “metalinguistic” negation,
signaled by heavy lexical stress on the negated constituent (I didn’t read the book
that Maya gave me because she didn’t GIVE me any book!). But then metalinguistic
negation can negate anything at all, including intonation, lexical choice, or accent.
Modulo this possibility, the backgrounded constituents of a sentence are not part
of what is asserted by the sentence.
9. Pam, as I told you before, didn’t sell the book to the man she
just met.
negates that the book was sold; does not negate that she
just met a man or that the speaker is repeating herself.
It has long been observed that the gap in a LDD construction
is typically within the potential focus domain of the utterance
(Takami, 1989; Erteschik-Shir, 1998; Polinsky, 1998; Van Valin,
1998; see also Morgan, 1975): this predicts that topics,
presupposed constituents, constituents within complex noun
phrases, and parentheticals are all island constructions and they
are (see previous work and Goldberg, 2013 for examples).
It is necessary to expand this view slightly by defining
BACKGROUNDED CONSTITUENTS to include everything in a
clause except constituents within the focus domain and the
subject. Like the focus domain, the subject argument is part
of what is made prominent or foregrounded by the sentence
in the given discourse context, since the subject argument is
the default TOPIC of the clause or what the clause is “about”
(MacWhinney, 1977; Chafe, 1987; Langacker, 1987; Lambrecht,
1994). That is, a clausal topic is a “matter of [already established]
current interest which a statement is about and with respect to
which a proposition is to be interpreted as relevant” (Michaelis
and Francis, 2007: 119). The topic serves to contextualize other
elements in the clause (Strawson, 1964; Kuno, 1976; Langacker,
1987; Chafe, 1994). We can now state the restriction on LDDs
succinctly:
⋆ Backgrounded constituents cannot be “extracted” in
LDD constructions (Backgrounded Constituents are Islands;
Goldberg, 2006, 2013).
The claim in ⋆ entails that only elements within the potential
focus domain or the subject are candidates for LDDs. Notice that
constituents properly contained within the subject argument are
backgrounded in that they are not themselves the primary topic,
nor are they part of the focus domain. Therefore, subjects are
“islands” to extraction.
Why should ⋆ hold? The restriction follows from a clash of
the functions of LDD constructions and island constructions. As
explained below: a referent cannot felicitously be both discourse-
prominent (in the LDD construction) and backgrounded
in discourse (in the island construction). That is, LDD
constructions exist in order to position a particular constituent
in a discourse-prominent slot; island constructions ensure that
the information that they convey is backgrounded in discourse.
It is anomalous for an argument, which the speaker has chosen to
make prominent by using a LDD construction, to correspond to
a gap that is within a backgrounded (island) construction.
What is meant by a discourse-prominent position? The
wh-word in a question LDD is a classic focus, as are the fronted
elements in “cleft” constructions, another type of LDD. The
fronted argument in a topicalization construction is a newly
established topic (Gregory and Michaelis, 2001)8. Each of these
LDD constructions operates at the sentence level and the main
8The present understanding of discourse prominence implicitly acknowledges the
notions of topic and focus are not opposites: both allow for constituents to be
interpreted as being prominent (see, e.g., Arnold, 1998: for experimental and
corpus evidence demonstrating the close relationship between topic and focus).
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clause topic and focus are classic cases of discourse-prominent
positions.
The relative clause construction is a bit trickier because the
head noun of a relative clause—the “moved” constituent—is
not necessarily the main clause topic or focus, and so it may
not be prominent in the general discourse. For this reason, it
has been argued that relative clauses involve a case of recycling
the formal structure and constraints that are motivated in
the case of questions to apply to a distinct but related case:
relative clauses (Polinsky, 1998). But in fact, the head noun in
a relative clause construction is prominent when it is considered
in relation to the relative clause itself: the purpose of a relative
clause is to identify or characterize the argument expressed
by the head noun. In this way, the head noun should not
correspond to a constituent that is backgrounded within the
relative clause. Thus, there is a clash for the same reason that
sentence level LDD constructions clash with island constructions,
except that what is prominent and what is backgrounded is
relative to the content of the NP: the head noun is prominent
and any island constructions within the relative clause are
backgrounded.
We should expect the ill-formedness of LDDs to be gradient
and degrees of ill-formedness are predicted to correspond
to degrees of backgroundedness, when other factors related
to frequency, plausibility, and complexity are controlled for.
This idea motivated an experimental study of various clausal
complements, including “bridge” verbs, manner-of-speaking
verbs, and factive verbs and exactly the expected correlation
was found (Ambridge and Goldberg, 2008): the degree of
acceptability of extraction showed a strikingly strong inverse
correlation with the degree of backgroundedness of the
complement clause—which was operationalized by judgments
on a negation test. Thus, the claim is that each construction
has a function and that constructions are combined to form
utterances; constraints on “extraction” arise from a clash of
discourse constraints on the constructions involved.
The functional account predicts that certain cases pattern
as they do, even though they are exceptional from a purely
syntactic point of view (see also Engdahl, 1997). These include
the cases in Table 4. Nominal complements of indefinite
“picture nouns” fall within the focus domain, as do certain
adjuncts, while the recipient argument of the double object
construction, as a secondary topic, does not (see Goldberg,
2006, 2013 for discussion). Therefore, the first two cases in
Table 2 are predicted to allow LDDs while the final case is
predicted to resist LDDs9 . No special assumptions or stipulations
are required.
There is much more to say about island effects (see e.g.,
Sprouse and Hornstein, 2013). The hundreds of volumes written
on the subject cannot be properly addressed in a short review
such as this. The goal of this section is to suggest that
This makes sense once we realize that one sentence’s focus is often the next
sentence’s topic.
9Cross linguistic work is needed to determine whether secondary topics generally
resist LDDs as is the case in the English double-object construction, or whether the
dispreference is only detectable when an alternative possibility is available, as in
English, where questioning the recipient of the to-dative is preferred (see note 10).
TABLE 4 | Cases that follow from an information structure account, but
not from an account that attempts to derive the restrictions from
configurations of syntactic trees.
Who did she take [a picture of __]?
(cf. She took [a picture of Sally])
Reduced relative clauses that are within
the focus domain (e.g., “picture NPs”)
are not islands; those that are not within
the focus domain are islands.
Who did she wait in line [in order to see
__]?
Non-backgrounded adjuncts
(cf. She waited in line [in order to see
U2]).
??Who did she give the book?10
(cf. She gave Aliza the book.)
(cf. also, Who did she give the book to?)
Backgrounded (as the secondary topic)
recipient argument of the double object
construction
a recognition of the functions of the relevant constructions
involved can explain which constructions are islands and why;
much more work is required to explore whether this proposal
accounts for each and every LDD construction in English and
other languages.
SUBJECT AUXILIARY INVERSION (SAI)
SAI’s Distribution
Subject-auxiliary inversion (e.g., is this it?) has a distribution that
is quite unique to English. In Old English, it followed a more
general “verb second” pattern, which still exists in Germanic and
a few other languages. But English changed, as languages do, and
today, subject-auxiliary inversion requires an auxiliary verb and
is restricted to a limited range of constructions, enumerated in
(10–17):
10. Did she go? Y/N questions
Where did she go? (non-subject) WH-questions
11. Had she gone, they would be here by now. Counterfactual
conditionals
12. Seldom had she gone there. Initial negative adverbs
13. May a million fleas infest his armpits! Wishes/Curses
14. He was faster at it than was she. Comparatives
15. Neither do they vote. Negative conjunct
16. Boy did she go, or what?! Exclamatives
17. So does he. Positive elliptical conjunctions
When SAI is used, the entire subject argument appears after the
first main clause auxiliary as is clear in a comparison of (18a) and
(18b):
18. a. Has the girl who was in the back of the room had enough
to eat? (inverted).
b. The girl who was in the back of the room has had enough
to eat. (non-inverted).
Notice that the very first auxiliary in the corresponding
declarative sentence (was) cannot be inverted (see 19a), nor can
the second (or other) main clause auxiliary (see 19b).
10Support for this judgment comes from the fact that questions of the recipient of
the to-dative outnumber those of the recipient of the double-object construction
in corpus data by a factor of 40 to 1 (Goldberg, 2006: 136).
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19. a. ∗Was the girl who in the back of the room has had enough
to eat? (only the main clause auxiliary can be inverted).
b. ∗Had the girl who was in the back of the room has enough
to eat? (only the first main clause auxiliary can be
inverted).
Thus, the generalization at issue is that the first auxiliary in
the full clause containing the subject is inverted with the entire
subject constituent.
SAI occurs in a range of constructions in English and each one
has certain unique constraints and properties (Fillmore, 1999;
Goldberg, 2009); for example, in the construction with negative
adverbs (e.g., 12), the adverb is positioned clause initially; curses
(e.g., 13) are quite particular about which auxiliary may be used
(May a million fleas invest your armpits. vs.∗Might/will/shall a
million fleas invest your armpits!); and inversion in comparatives
(e.g., 14) is restricted to a formal register. Thus, any descriptively
adequate account of SAI in English must make reference to these
properties of individual constructions.
The English constructions evolved diachronically from a
more general constraint which still operative in German main
clauses. But differences exist across even these closely related
languages. The German constraint applies to main verbs, while
English requires an auxiliary verb, and in English the auxiliary is
commonly in first not second position (e.g., did I get that right?).
Also, verb-second in German is a main clause phenomenon,
but in English, SAI is possible in embedded clauses as
well (20–21):
20. “And Janet, do you think that had he gotten a diagnosis
younger, it would have been a different outcome?” (COCA)
21. “Many of those with an anti-hunting bias have the idea that
were it not for the bloodthirsty human hunter, game would
live to ripe old age” (COCA)
Simple recurrent connectionist networks can learn to invert
the correct auxiliary on the basis of simpler input that
children uncontroversially receive (Lewis and Elman, 2001).
This model is instructive because it is able to generalize
correctly to produce complex questions (e.g., Is the man
who was green here?), after receiving training on simple
questions and declarative statements with a relative clause.
The network takes advantage of the fact that both simple
noun phrases (the boy) and complex noun phrases (The
boy who chases dogs) have similar distributions in the input
(see also Pullum and Scholz, 2002; Reali and Christiansen,
200511; Ambridge et al., 2006; Rowland, 2007; Perfors et al.,
2011).
The reason simple and complex subjects have similar
distributions is that the subject is a coherent semantic unit,
typically referring to an entity or set of entities. For example,
in (22a–c), he, the boy, and the boy in the front row, all identify
a particular person and each sentence asserts that the person in
question is tall.
11See Kam et al. (2008) for discussion of the difficulties of using only bi-grams.
Since we assume that meaningful units are combined to form larger meaningful
units, resulting in hierarchical structure, this critique does not undermine the
present proposal.
22.a. He is tall.
b. The boy is tall.
c. The boy who sat in front of me is tall.
Thus the distributional fact that is sufficient for learning the key
generalization is that subjects, whether simple or complex, serve
the same function in sentences.
We might also ask why SAI is used in the range of
constructions it is, and why these constructions use this formal
feature instead of placing the subject in sentence-final position
or some other arbitrary feature. Consider the function of the
first auxiliary of the clause containing the subject. This auxiliary
indicates tense and number agreement (23), but an auxiliary is
not required for these functions, as themain verb can equally well
express them (24).
23. a. She did say.
b. They do say.
24. a. She said.
b. They say.
The first auxiliary of the clause containing the subject obligatorily
serves a different purpose related to negative or emphasized
positive polarity (Langacker, 1991). That is, if a sentence is
negated, the negativemorpheme occurs immediately after—often
cliticized to—the first auxiliary of the clause that contains the
subject (25):
25. She hadn’t been there.
And if positive polarity is emphasized, it is the first auxiliary that
is accented (26):
26. She HAD been there. (cf. She had been there).
If the corresponding simple positive sentence does not contain an
auxiliary, the auxiliary verb do is drafted into service (27):
27.a. She DID swim in the ocean.
b. She did not swim in the ocean.
c. She didn’t swim in the ocean.
(cf. She swam in the ocean).
Is it a coincidence that the first auxiliary of the main clause
that contains the subject conveys polarity? Intriguingly, most
SAI constructions offer different ways to implicate a negative
proposition, or at least to avoid asserting a simple positive one
(Brugman and Lakoff, 1987; Goldberg, 2006)12 . For example,
yes/no questions ask whether or not the proposition is true;
counterfactual conditionals deny that the antecedent holds; and
the inverted clause in a comparative can be paraphrased with a
negated clause as in (28):
28. He was faster than was she. She was not as fast as he was.
Exclamatives have the form of rhetorical yes/no questions, and
in fact they commonly contain tag questions (e.g., Is he a jerk,
or what?!) (Goldberg and Giudice, 2005). They also have the
12Labov (1968) discusses another SAI construction used in AAVE, which requires
a negated auxiliary (e.g., Can’t nobody go there.).
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pragmatic force of emphasizing the positive polarity, which we
have seen is another function of the first auxiliary. Likewise, the
positive conjunction (so did she) emphasizes positive polarity as
well.
Thus the form of SAI in English is motivated by the functions
of the vast majority of SAI constructions: in order to indicate
non-canonical polarity of a sentence—either negative polarity or
emphasized positive polarity—the auxiliary required to convey
polarity is inverted. Once the generalization is recognized to be
iconic in this way, it becomes much less mysterious both from a
descriptive and an acquisition perspective.
There is only one case where SAI is used without implicating
either negative polarity or emphasizing positive polarity: non-
subject wh-questions. This case appears to be an instance of
recycling a formal pattern for use with a construction that has
a related function to one that is directly motivated (see also
Nevalainen, 1997). In particular, wh-questions have a function
that is clearly related to yes/no questions since both are questions.
But while SAI is directly motivated by the non-positive polarity
of yes/no questions, this motivation does not extend to wh-
questions (also see Goldberg, 2006 and Langacker, 2012 for a
way tomotivate SAI in wh-questionsmore directly). Nonetheless,
to ignore the relationship between the function of the first
auxiliary as an indicator of negative polarity or emphasized
positive polarity, and the functions of SAI constructions, which
overwhelmingly involve exactly the same functions, is to overlook
an explanation of the construction’s formal property and its
distribution. Thus, we have seen that the fact that the subject
is treated as a unit (so that any auxiliary within the subject
is irrelevant) is not mysterious once we recognize that it is a
semantic unit. Moreover, the fact that it is the first auxiliary of
the clause that is inverted is motivated by the functions of the
constructions that exhibit SAI.
CROSS-LINGUISTIC GENERALIZATIONS
ABOUT THE LINKING BETWEEN
SEMANTICS AND SYNTAX
The last type of generalization considered here is perhaps
the most straightforward. There are certain claims about
how individual semantic arguments are mapped to syntax
that have been claimed to require syntactic stipulation, but
which follow straightforwardly from the semantic functions of
the arguments.
Consider the claimed universal that the number of semantic
arguments equals the number of overt complements expressed
(the “θ criterion”; see also Lidz et al., 2003a). While the
generalization holds, roughly, in English, it does not in many—
perhaps the majority—of the world’s languages, which readily
allow recoverable or irrelevant arguments to be omitted. Even
in English, particular constructions circumvent the general
tendency. For example, short passives allow the semantic agent
or causer argument to be unexpressed (e.g., The duck was
killed), and the “deprofiled object construction” allows certain
arguments to be omitted because they are irrelevant (e.g.,
Lions only kill at night). (Goldberg, 2000). Thus, the original
syntactic claim is too strong. Amoremodest, empirically accurate
generalization is captured by the following:
Pragmatic Mapping Generalization (Goldberg, 2004):
A) The referents of linguistically expressed arguments are
interpreted to be relevant to the message being conveyed.
B) Any semantic participants in the event being conveyed that
are relevant and non-recoverable from contextmust be overtly
indicated.
The pragmatic mapping generalization makes use of the fact that
language is a means of communication and therefore requires
that speakers say as much as is necessary but not more (Paul,
1889; Grice, 1975). Note that the pragmatic generation does
not make any predictions about semantic arguments that are
recoverable or irrelevant. This is important because, as already
mentioned, languages and constructions within languages treat
those arguments variably.
Another general cross-linguistic tendency is suggested by
Dowty (1991), who proposed a linking generalization that is
now widely cited as capturing the observable (i.e., surface) cross-
linguistic universals about how syntactic relations and semantic
arguments are linked. Dowty argued that in simple active clauses,
if there both a subject and an object, and if there is an agent-like
semantic argument and an undergoer-like semantic argument,
then the agent will be expressed by the subject, and the undergoer
will be expressed by the direct object (see also Van Valin,
1990). Agent-like entities are entities that are volitional, sentient,
causal or moving, while undergoers are those arguments that
undergo a change of state, are causally affected or are stationary.
Dowty further observed that his generalization is violated in
syntactically ergative languages, which are quite complicated
and do not neatly map the agent-like argument to a subject.
In fact, there are no syntactic tests for subjecthood that are
consistent across languages so there is no reason to assume
that the grammatical relation of subject is universal (Dryer,
1997).
At the same time, there does exist a more modest “linking”
generalization that is accurate: actors and undergoers are
generally expressed in prominent syntactic slots (Goldberg,
2006). This simpler generalization, which I have called the salient-
participants-in-prominent-slots generalization has the advantage
that it accurately predicts that an actor argument without an
undergoer, and an undergoer without an actor are also expressed
in prominent syntactic positions.
The tendency to express salient participants in prominent slots
follows from well-documented aspects of our general attentional
biases. Humans’ attention is naturally drawn to agents, even in
non-linguistic tasks. For example, visual attention tends to be
centered on the agent in an event (Robertson and Suci, 1980).
Speakers also tend to adopt the perspective of the agent of the
event (MacWhinney, 1977; Hall et al., 2013). Infants as young as
9 months have been shown to attribute intentional behavior even
to inanimate objects that have appropriate characteristics (e.g.,
motion, apparent goal-directedness) (Csibra et al., 1999). That is,
even, pre-linguistic infants attend closely to the characteristics of
agents (volition, sentience, and movement) in visual as well as
linguistic tasks.
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The undergoer in an event is also attention-worthy, as it is
generally the endpoint of a real or metaphorical force (Langacker,
1987; Talmy, 1988; Croft, 1991). The tendency to attend closely
endpoints of actions that involve a change of state exists even in
6 month old infants (Woodward, 1998), and we know that the
effects of actions play a key role in action-representations both in
motor control of action and in perception (Prinz, 1990, 1997). For
evidence that undergoers are salient in non-linguistic tasks, see
also Csibra et al. (1999); Bekkering et al. (2000); Javanovic et al.
(2007). For evidence that endpoints or undergoers are salient
in linguistic tasks, see Regier and Zheng (2003); Lakusta and
Landau (2005), and Lakusta et al. (2007). Thus, the observation
that agents and undergoers tend to be expressed in prominent
syntactic positions is explained by general facts about human
perception and attention.
Other generalizations across languages are also amenable to
functional explanations. There is a strong universal tendency for
languages to have some sort of construction that can reasonably
be termed a “passive.” But these passive constructions only
share a general function: they are constructions in which the
topic and/or agent argument is essentially “demoted,” appearing
optionally or not at all. In this way, passive constructions offer
speakers more flexibility in how information is packaged. But
whether or which auxiliary appears, whether a given language
has one, two, or three passives, whether or not intransitive verbs
occur in the pattern, and whether or how the demoted subject
argument is marked, all differ across different languages (Croft,
2001), and certain languages such as Choctaw do not seem
to contain any type of passive (Van Valin, 1980). That is the
only robust generalization about passive depends on its function
and is very modest: most, but not all languages, have a way to
express what is normally the most prominent argument in a less
prominent position.
CONCLUSION
When it was first proposed that our knowledge of language was
so complex and subtle and that the input was so impoverished
that certain syntactic knowledge must be given to us a priori, the
argument was fairly compelling (Chomsky, 1965). At that time,
we did not have access to large corpora of child-directed speech
so we did not realize how massively repetitive the input was; nor
did we have large corpora of children’s early speech, so we did not
appreciate how closely children’s initial productions reflect their
input (see e.g., Mintz et al., 2002; Cameron-Faulkner et al., 2003).
We also had not yet fully appreciated how statistical learning
worked, nor how powerful it was (e.g., Saffran et al., 1996; Gomez
and Gerken, 2000; Fiser and Aslin, 2002; Saffran, 2003; Abbot-
Smith et al., 2008; Wonnacott et al., 2008; Kam and Newport,
2009). Connectionist and Bayesianmodeling had not yet revealed
that associative learning and rational inductive inferences could
be used to address many aspects of language learning (see e.g.,
Elman et al., 1996; Perfors et al., 2007; Alishahi and Stevenson,
2008; Bod, 2009). The important role of language’s function as
a means of communication was widely ignored (but see e.g.,
Lakoff, 1969; Bolinger, 1977; DuBois, 1987; Langacker, 1987;
Givón, 1991). Finally, the widespread recognition of emergent
phenomena was decades away (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, 1992;
Lander and Schork, 1994; Elman et al., 1996). Today, however,
armed with these tools, we are able to avoid the assumption that
all languages must be “underlyingly” the same in key respects
or learned via some sort of tailor-made “Language Acquisition
Device” (Chomsky, 1965). In fact, if Universal Grammar consists
only of recursion via “merge,” as Chomsky has proposed (Hauser
et al., 2002), it is unclear how it could even begin to address the
purported poverty of the input issue in any case (Ambridge et al.,
2015).
Humans are unique among animals in the impressive diversity
of our communicative systems (Dryer, 1997; Croft, 2001;
Tomasello, 2003:1; Haspelmath, 2008; Evans and Levinson,
2009; Everett, 2009). If we assume that all languages share
certain important formal parallels “underlyingly” due to a
tightly constrained Universal Grammar, except perhaps for some
simple parameter settings, it would seem to be an unexplained
and maladaptive feature of languages that they involve such
rampant superficial variation. In fact, there are cogent arguments
against positing innate, syntax-specific, universal knowledge
of language, as it is biologically and evolutionarily highly
implausible (Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; Chater et al., 2009;
Christiansen and Chater, 2016).
Instead, what makes language possible is a certain
combination of prerequisites for language, including our
pro-social motivation and skill (e.g., Hermann et al., 2007;
Tomasello, 2008); the general trade off between economy of
effort and maximization of expressive power (e.g., Levy, 2008;
Futrell et al., 2015; Kirby et al., 2015; Kurumada and Jaeger,
2015); the power of statistical learning (Saffran et al., 1996;
Gomez and Gerken, 2000; Saffran, 2003; Wonnacott et al.,
2008; Kam and Newport, 2009); and the fact that frequently
used patterns tend to become conventionalized and abbreviated
(Heine, 1992; Dabrowska, 2004; Bybee et al., 1997; Verhagen,
2006; Traugott, 2008; Bybee, 2010; Hilpert, 2013; Traugott and
Trousdale, 2013; Christiansen and Chater, 2016).
While these prerequisites for language are highly pertinent
to the discussion of whether we need to appeal to a Universal
Grammar, the present paper has attempted to address a different
set of facts. Many generative linguists take the existence of subtle,
intricate, knowledge about language that speakers implicitly
know without being taught as evidence in favor of the Universal
Grammar Hypothesis. By examining certain of these well-
studied such cases, we have seen that, while the facts are
sometimes even more complex and subtle than is generally
appreciated, they do not require that we resort to positing
syntactic structures that are unlearned. Instead, these cases
are explicable in terms of the functions of the constructions
involved. That is, the constructionist perspective views intricate
and subtle generalizations about language as emerging on the
basis of domain-general constraints on perception, attention,
and memory, and on the basis of the functions of the
learned, conventionalized constructions involved. This paper has
emphasized the latter point.
Constructionists recognize that languages are not
unconstrained in their variation and that various systematic
patterns recur in unrelated languages. While certain
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generalizations follow from domain-general processing
constraints (see e.g., McRae et al., 1998; Hawkins, 1999; Futrell
et al., 2015), this paper as argued that many constraints and
generalizations follow from the functions of the constructions
involved. That is, speakers can combine conventional
constructions in their language on the fly to create new
utterances, but the functions of each of the constructions
involved must be respected. This allows speakers to use language
in dynamic, but delimited ways.
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